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United States V. Ferebe
332 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 2003)
I. Facts
On September 16, 1997, Donald Lee Ferebe ("Ferebe") was indicted, along
with a co-defendant, on federal drug, gun, and murder charges.1 The indictment
charged Ferebe with the shootings of Benjamin Harvey Page ("Page") and
Yolanda Evans ("Evans").2 The prosecution sought authorization from the
United States Attorney General to seek the death penalty. In May 1998 the
Attorney General authorized the death penalty for only the count charging
Ferebe with the murder of Page.4 The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland separated Ferebe's trial from his co-defendant's trial because
his co-defendant was not eligible for the death penalty.5
Ferebe filed a motion for a continuance in order to postpone the trial until
his appeal from a prior marder conviction was final.' The district court granted
Ferebe's motion and postponed the trial! In September 1999 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit affirmed Ferebe's conviction and
sentence on the prior murder charge The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in early2000.9 In June 2000 the prosecution offered Ferebe concurrent
life sentences for the murders of Page and Evans in exchange for a guiltyplea.10
1. United States v. Ferebe, 332 F.3d 722,724 (4th CAr. 2003). "Ferebe and his co-defendant
were indicted under four provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code." Id at 724 n.1; see 18
U.S.C S 2(a) (2000) (stating that a person who aids or abets the commission of an offense is
punishable as a principa4; 18 U.S.C S 924(c)(1)(A) (2000) (stating that the use and carrying of
firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime qualifies the accused for an enhanced
sentence); 18 U.S.C S 924) (1) (2000) (stating that a person who causes the death of another with
a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime may "be punished by death or by
o nt for any term of years or for life"); 21 US.C S 841(a)(1) (2000) (stating that it is
unlawful for a person to distribute controlled substances).
2. Fenlp, 332 F.3d at 724. Page was a "potential witness against Ferebe on an unrelated
1994 murder charge then pending," and Evans was an innocent bystander. Id at 741 (Niemeyer,
J., dissenting).
3. Idat 724.
4. Id at 741 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
5. Id at 725. The Attomney General did not authorize the death penaltyagainst Ferebe's co-
defendant for either of the two murders. Id
6. Id at 741 (Nlemeyer, J., dissenting).
7. I d at 742 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).




In October 2000 Ferebe refused the offer and insisted on proceeding to trial."
In December 2000 the district court held a hearing at which Ferebe formally
rejected the offer. 2 At the hearing, the prosecution formally withdrew the plea
offer and the court scheduled Ferebe's trial for September 10, 2001.3 The
prosecution did not file a Notice of Intention to Seek the Death Penalty ("Death
Notice") as required under 18 U.S.C S 3593(a) prior to the December 2000
hearing.
14
On May 28, 2001, five months prior to the scheduled trial date, the U.S.
Attorney asked the Attorney General to reconsider the decision not to authorize
the death penalty for the murder of Evans."5 Approximately one month later,
Ferebe's attorney contacted the prosecution to inform them that Ferebe wished
to plead guiltyto both murders in exchange for concurrent life sentences. 6 On
June 19, the parties signed a formal plea agreement subject to approval by the
Attorney General." As a result of the conditional plea, several June and July
hearings were postponed. 8 On July6, 2001, just two months before Ferebe's
trial, the Attorney General authorized the death penalty on Ferebe's second
murder charge. 9 On July 26, the "Assistant Attorney General in charge of
DOJ's Criminal Division informed the prosecution that the plea agreement was
unacceptable." 0 At a meeting on July 31, defense counsel stated that Ferebe
would plead guiltyeven in the absence of a plea agreement.2' Counsel for Ferebe
explained that this plea would only subject Ferebe to life imprisonment because
the Government had not 'filed its Death Notice. 2 On August 1, 2001, the
11. Id at 742 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Fedr, 332 F.3d at 725; se 18 U.S.C S 3593 (a) (2000) (stating that "in a case involving an
offense described in section 3591 . .. the attorney (for the Government] shall, a reasonable time
before the trial or before acceptance bythe court of a plea of guilty sign and file with the court, and
serve on the defendant, a notice"). In December 2000 "Ferebe's indictment was more than four
years old and the Attorney General's authorization of the death penalty was more than three and
a half years old." Fev~e 332 F.3d at 725 n.2. Ferebe offered evidence that federal prosecutors file
Death Notices with an average of 8.4 months remaining before trial Id at 725.
15. Fea' 332 F.3d at 725.
16. Id
17. Id A newDepartment of Justice policytook effect onJune 7,2001, "requiring prosecu-
tors to obtain the Attorney General's consent prior to consummating plea agreements with death-
eligible defendants." Id
18. Id These hearings were scheduled with the intent to "prepare trial materials such as the
jury questionnaires and to address various pre-trial issues." Id
19. Id at 726.
20. Id
21. Fed , 332 F.3d at 726.
22. Id at 742 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting.
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prosecution formally filed a Death Notice for the murders of both Page and
Evans pursuant to S 3593(a).3
Ferebe filed a motion to strike the notice as untimely.4 On September 7,
2001, the district court conducted a hearing on the motion.2" On September 12,
the district court denied Ferebe's motion to strike the Death Notice.26  The
district court based its decision to deny the motion upon its findn that the
timing of the notice did not cause Ferebe to suffer any prejudice. Ferebe
appealed the district court's denial of the motion to the Fourth Circuit on the
grounds that the Death Notice was untimely under S 3593(a).
H. Hddirg
The Fourth Circuit held that denials of motions to strike Death Notices are
immediatelyappealable under the collateral order doctrine.29 The court also held
that the timeliness of a Death Notice should be analyzed by a "pre-trial inquiry
into the objective reasonableness of that timing."' The Fourth Cicuit vacated
the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings to
determine the objective reasonableness of the timing of the Death Notice."1
111. A, mis
Ferebe challenged the district court's denial of his motion to strike and bar
the Death Notice on the grounds that the notice was not timely provided. 2 He
argued that S 3593(a) requires that notice of the Government's intention to seek
the death penalty be given within a reasonable time before trial." Ferebe con-
ceded that the district court's denial of his motion to strike the Death Notice was
23. Id at 726;see18 U.S.C S 3593(a) (2000) (providing that the Govern ent shallfile anotice
of its ient to seek the death penaltya reasonable time before trial).
24. Fenf 332 F3d at 726. Ferebe claimed that the Death Notice was untimely because it
was so late after the filing of the indictment and so close to the September 10 trial date. Id at 742
(Niemejer, J., dissenting).
25. Id at 742 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
26. Id at 743 (Nemeyer, J., dissenting).
27. Id The court stated that Ferebe had actual notice that the Government intended to seek
the death penaltyon the filst murder charge. Id The court reasoned that Ferebe's "preparation for
the second death penaltycount was not substantiallydifferent than that for the first count on which
Ferebe had actual notice." Id
28. Id at 726.
29. Id at 724.
30. Fedr, 332 F.3d at 724.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id; see 18 US.C 3593(a) (2000) (stating that in a case in which the United States
Attorney believes that a death sentence is appropriate, he shall give notice to the defendant 'a
reasonable time before the trial").
2003]
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not a final judgment. 4 He claimed, however, that the order denying his motion
was reviewable as a collateral order under the standards set forth in Cdxn v
Bmfui4 IriutriJ a Loan Cop."' The Government argued that the order was not
a collateral order and, if it was, Ferebe received such notice a reasonable time
before trial36
A. Appailabiity
The district court's order, which Ferebe appealed, was a pre-trial order.3"
Under 28 U.S.C, S 1291, federal courts of appeals are authorized to review "final
decisions of the district courts.""' The term "final decision" refers to a final
judgment that terminates a criminal proceeding. 9 Generally, that is a judgment
of guilt.4° Defendants seeking review of pre-trial orders normallymust wait until
the end of trial.4 However, the Supreme Court has identified exceptions to this
general rule.42 A preliminary decision is appealable as a collateral order if it: (1)
is conclusive; (2) resolves an issue separate from the merits; and (3) is "effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."43
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Ferebe that the district court's order was
reviewable as a collateral order." The court held that "district court orders
denying motions to strike Death Notices as untimely filed are immediately
appealable."4 The Fourth CGrcuit stated that the order satisfied the three-part
test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Cdaen and A bray v United
State. Under A bray, the order was sufficiently collateral to permit interlocutory
34. Fedrd 332 F.3d at 724; se 28 US.C S 1291 (2000) (stating that the courts of appeals
.shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States").
35. Ferdve 332 F.3d at 724; see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (discussing that an order is appealable as a collateral order when it is conclusive, is not
intertwined with the merits, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment).
36. Fednr 332 F.3d at 724.
37. Id at 726.
38. 28 U.S.C S 1291.
39. Ferde, 332 F.3d at 726; see Sell v. United States, 123 S. C. 2174,2182 (2003) (discussing
appealability of collateral orders); Meghan I- Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 295 (2003)
(analyzing Sell v. United States, 123 S. C. 2174 (2003)).
40. SeeSde1 123 S. Ct. at 2182 (stating that collateralorders are conclusive, separate fromthe
merits, and effectively unreviewable on appeal).
41. Id
42. Id at 2182; se Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978) (discussing
the collateral order exception to the rule that only final judgments maybe reviewed on appeal).
43. SdI, 123 S. Cr. at 2182 (quoting CQxen & L)brwa 437 U.S. at 468).
44. FenS 332 F.3d at 726.
45. Id
46. Id; seAbneyv. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) (explaining the three factors for
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appeal because it: (1) fully disposed of the issue it addressed; (2) was collateral
to the merits of the prosecution; and (3) involved an important right which
would be lost if review awaited a final judgment.47
The Government conceded that the district court's order satisfied the first
two factors." The Fourth Circuit explained that the order was conclusive
because it denied "once and for all" Ferebe's motion to strike the Death Notice."'
Ferebe's motion sought avoidance of a capital trial, but upon denial the district
court scheduled the case for such a trial50 Therefore, the district court's order
denying Ferebe's motion fully disposed of the issue it addressed."1 The Fourth
Crcuit also found that the second factor was satisfied because the order resolved
an issue collateral to the merits of the case. 2 The court stated that "[t]he ques-
tion of whether Ferebe received the statutorily-required reasonable notice is
entirely separate from the question.of his guilt for the murders committed, and
its resolution will neither affect nor be affected by resolution of this latter ques-
tion." 3 Thus, the Fourth Grcuit held that the first two factors underA beywere
satisfied."'
The third A bny factor addresses "whether the right allegedly at stake will
likely be lost irreparably if immediate review is denied." 5 The Fourth Circuit
stated that the focus of this inquiry is "whether the assurances underlying the
asserted right will be [lost] if review is delayed until after trial."'7 The court
found that the underlying right guaranteed byS 3593(a) is the right "not to stand
trial" without adequate time to prepare for a death penalty trial." The court
reasoned that the underlying right would be lost if review of the order was
determining whether an order is sufficiently collateral to permit ocutoryappeal); swaoCd
337 U.S. at 546 (discussing the three requirements for finding finality under the collateral order
doctrine).
47. Fadie, 332 F.3d at 726 (citing Abr 431 U.S. at 658).
48. Id
49. Id at 727.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id at 728.
53. Fedb* 332 F.3d at 728; seeAhrto; 431 US. at 659-60 (stating that an order is collateral
to the merits when the elements of the petitioner's claim are "completely independent of his guilt
or innocence").
54. Fedx 332 F.3d at 730.
55. Id at 728.
56. Id[ at 729; s A 431 US. at 660-61 (finding the third prong satisfied because the
Double Jeopardy clause would be violated by the postponement of review because the defendant
would lose the right not to "endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a
criminal. trial").
57. Fenke 332 F.3d at 730.
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postponed until after the defendant stood trialP The court stated that "delayin
the review of a claimed denial of this right until after the trial itself has taken
place is tantamount to countenance of the denial of the right." 9 Once an
accused is forced to stand trial without timely notice, the right guaranteed by S
3593(a) has been irreparably lost.' The Fourth Circuit held that the thirdA b~ry
factor was satisfied because the district court's order was effectivelyunreviewable
post-trial.6'
B. pQ iw Razacnt~is
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred byadopting a post-trial,
prejudice-based, analytical framework62 The court stated that the proper analysis
required an inquiry into the pre-trial objective reasonableness of the notice
provided. 3 Because the district court failed to use the proper analytical frame-
work, certain elements necessary to a merits determination were not addressed
bythe district court.' The Fourth Carcuit stated that it was unable to dispose of
Ferebe's claim without such findings, vacated the order, and remanded the case
for further proceedings. 5
1. zizaeA ssersnnt aPm-tra Raau kwzs
The Fourth Circuit interpreted S 3593(a) as guaranteeing capital defendants
the right not to stand trial unless notice was provided a reasonable time before
trial.66 The court stated that this "prophylactic requirement... nemsitat a
pretrial inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the notice provided."67  A
post-trial prejudice analysis forces "defendants to riskpmwn orfriuor of" this
statutory right by forcing them to endure possible unlawful trials.6 A defen-
dant's S 3593(a) right is denied at the point he is forced to proceed to trial
without reasonable notice that the Government will seek the death penalty.69
58. Id at 729.
59. Id
60. Id at 730.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Farb, 332 F3d at 730.
64. Id
65. Id; see 18 US.C S 3593 (a) (2000) (stating that the prosecution must file its Death Notice
a reasonable time before trial).
66. Fe, 332 F.3d at 730.
67. Id at 731.
68. Id
69. Id at 732; se 18 US.C S 3593 (a) (stating that the prosecution must file its Death Notice
a reasonable time before trial).
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The court stated that the critical determination is the denial of this right and not
the possible prejudice suffered." The Fourth C-rcuit stated that "any dykin
raised on the right, whether to late notice before trial, to late notice after trial
begins, or to no notice at all, must establish that notice was not provided a
muomUe time before trial."" Thus, the Fourth Circuit adopted an "objective
assessment of pre-trial reasonableness.""
2. Rixm q'dw Speey Tnai A nzlqgy
The district court analogized the S 3593(a) right to the speedy trial right,
which is governed by a post-trial assessment of prejudice.73 The Fourth Crcuit
rejected this analogyand laid out numerous differences between the two rights .'
First, the court noted the unique nature of the speedy trial right "in that it
belongs to beb the defendant andsociety.""7 A "violation of the speedytrial right
'might work to the accused's advantage.' "76 In contrast, the S 3593(a) right not
to stand trial without adequate notice "provides a guarantee onlyto the criminal
defendant."" A violation of this right denies the accused adequate time to
prepare his case and could not work to his advantage." Second, the Fourth
Circuit noted that under United Stam v MacDcmnkW the speedy trial right is not
a right not to stand trial." This fact differentiates the speedytrial right from the
70. Forke 332 F.3d at 732.
71. Id
72. Id at 734.
73. Id; se US. CONST. amend. VI (staing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutios, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial7); 18 US.C S 3593(a) (requiring the prosecution
to file a timely Death Notice).
74. Feab, 332 F.3d at 734.
75. Id;seUS. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the accused's right to a speedytdaD; Barker
v. Wmgo, 407 US. 514,519 (1972) (stating that "[t]he right to a speedy trial is generically different
from anyof the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused-). -In
addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair
procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedytrial which exists separate from, and at
times in opposition to, the interests of the accused." Barke, 407 US. at 519.
76. Feiv, 332 F.3d at 734 (quoting Baker, 407 US. at 521). In Baker, the Court explained
that a defendant may benefit from a delayed trial by securing more attractive plea bagains and
having the chance to jump bond. Barker, 407 US. at 519-21. The Government is at a disadvantage
because of the detrimental effect a delay between trial and arrest have on the preservation of
evidence and the high cost of lengthy pre-trial detention. Id
77. Febpd 332 F.3d at 734.
78. at 734-35.
79. 435 US. 850 (1978).
80. Fere, 332 F.3d at 735; see US. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial"); United States v. MacDonald,




S 3593(a) right that ensures that defendants will not be tried without valid
notice." The Fourth Circuit held that the district court's analogy to the speedy
trial right did not support a post-trial prejudice standard. 2
3. DaiHeJ any anInharI
The Fourth Circuit drew an analogy between the S 3593(a) right and the
Double Jeopardy right.83 Similar to S 3593(a), the Double Jeopardy clause
encompasses a right not to stand trial 4 The Fourth Circuit noted that Double
Jeopardy violations are not analyzed under a prejudice framework s5 The court
also compared Death Notices to indictments because both put the defendant on
notice and ensure adequate preparation prior to trial.86 Objections to the lawful-
ness of indictments are not analyzed under a prejudice inquiry.87 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit rejected a post-trial, prejudice analysis for alleged violations of S
3593(a).88
4. Fcur FatoforRaeaubis
The Fourth Circuit set forth the following four factors to be considered
when evaluating the reasonable timeliness of a Death Notice:
(1) the nature of the charges presented in the indictment; (2) the nature
ofthe aggravating factors provided in the Death Notice; (3) the period
of time remainifig before trial, measured at the instant the Death
Notice was filed and irrespective of the filing's effects; and, in addition,
(4) the status of discovery in the proceediigs8 9
81. Feabr, 332 F.3d at 735; se U.S. CoNST. amend. VI (ensuring the accused's right to a
speedy trial); 18 US.C S 3593(a) (2000) (providing that the Government shall file a notice of its
intent to seek the death penalty a reasonable time before triaD.
82. Ferd 332 F.3d at 734-35.
83. Id at 736; se U.S. COIsT. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall... be twice put in
jeopardyof life or limb"); 18 US.C S 3593(a) (providing that the Government shall file a notice of
its intent to seek the death penalty a reasonable time before trial.
84. Fea1 332 F.3d at 735; see US. CO,,T. amend. V (prohibiting trying an accused twice for
the same crime); 18 U.S.C S 3593 (a) (discussing the prosecution's obligation to file a Death Notice).
85. Fva , 332 F.3d at 736; swU.S. COrT. amend. V (stating that no person shall "be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb").
86. F66,, 332 F.3d at 736.
87. Id
88. Id at 737; see 18 US.C S 3593(a) (setting forth the Death Notice requirement).
89. Fenri 332 F.3d at 737. In order to evaluate the time period discussed in the third factor,
the court must know the date the Death Notice was filed and the trial date. Id at 737 n.6. The
court explained that the scheduled trial date constitutes the trial date for challenges under S 3593 (a).
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The district court did not properly address or make findings relevant to the four
reasonableness factors.9 The Fourth Circuit held such findings necessary for
review of the order.91
In particular, the district court did not make findings concerning the third
factor, the period of time between the filing of the Death Notice and the trial.92
The record did not reveal whether a set trial date existed at the time the Death
Notice was filed.93 Although the district court set a trial date for September 10,
2001, the record did not indicate whether that date remained fixed.9" The district
court suggested that the postponements of the June and July hearings and the
lack of a jury questionnaire effectively cancelled the September trial date." The
Fourth Grcuit noted that it was unclear whether "the trial start date was
cancelled M adwir cf th Dauh Notu'sfilvgani impaet g ."96 The court was
unable to determine whether the September 10 trial date firmly existed at the
time the Death Notice was filed.97 Without knowing the trial date, the Fourth
Circuit could not measure the period of time from the filing of the Death Notice
to the trial and was unable to reach any conclusions "as to the objective reason-
ableness of that yet unknown and unidentified interval."98 The Fourth Curcuit
remanded the case to allowthe district court to produce findings under a pre-trial
objective reasonableness analysis."
5. Dissernt
The dissent argued that the district court's order was not immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine." ° The dissent stated that the first
A bmy factor was not satisfied because the order did not conclusively determine
whetherthe Death Notice was timelyfiled.'0 ' The dissent agreed with the district
court that the Death Notice was filed a reasonable time before trial because
90. Id at 737.
91. Id
92. Id at 738.
93. Id
94. Id
95. Fenird 332 F.3d at 738-39.
96. Id at 738.
97. Id at 739.
98. Id at 740.
99. Id at 737.
100. Id at 751-53 (Niemeer, J., dissenting).
101. Ferd 332 F.3d at 751 (Niemeyer,J., dissenting). The dissent cites Cabin its discussion
of the coflateral order doctrine and refers to the three requirements as "CO1 i factors." Id at
750-51 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); se C&4 337 US. at 546 (setting forth the three requirements
under the collateral order doctrine).
2003]
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Ferebe did not suffer anyprejudice.0 2 In addition to the four factors identified
by the majority for assessing reasonableness, the dissent added a fifth."3 The
dissent stated that "the prejudice that the timing of the formal notice has on the
defendant's preparation for trial and on his presentation of the defense" is the
most important factor fordetermining reasonableness.'4 The dissent argued that
the order was "merely speculative" because it left open "the question of the
potential prejudice to Ferebe of trying a death penalty case with inadequate
preparation time."' According to the dissent's rationale, a determination of the
reasonableness of the length of time between the filing of the Death Notice and
the trial maybe made after the trial.'06 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the
order was inconclusive because an assessment of prejudice could be made post-
trial.
107
The dissent also argued that the second Abrwy factor was not satisfied
because the order involved issues intertwined with the merits°0 A determination
of prejudice often depends on the events occurring at trial.09 The lack of
adequate preparation time maybecome evident as the defendant presents his case
at trial ° The dissent stated that this type of analysis is not "sufficiently separate
from the merits to :satisfy the second requirement of the collateral order doc-
trne."111
Finally, the dissent argued that the third A bray requirement was not met
because the order remained "effectivelyreviewable upon final judgment."112 The
dissent stressed that Ferebe would retain his full rights to review after conviction
at trial."' The dissent stated that Ferebe's objection to the timeliness of the
Death Notice was effectivelyreviewable onlyafterthe trial, when the court could
102. Ferd, 332 F.3d at 743 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 749 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id
105. Id at 751 (Nlemeyer, J., dissenting); sweAbr!y, 431 U.S. at 658 (stating that an order is
sufficiendy collateral to permit interlocutory appeal if it fullydisposes of the issue it addresses).
106. Fe* 332 F.3d at 751 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
107. Id
108. Id; seeA MEb, 431 U.S. at 658 (stating that an order is sufficiently collateral to permit
interlocutory appeal if it resolves an issue completely collateral to the merits of the case).
109. Fer, 332 F.3d at 751 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); see MacDa/d, 435 US. at 859-60
(stating that a fair assessment of possible prejudice to the defendant can normally be made only
afterthetral).
110. Feni 332 F.3d at 751-52 (Nlemeyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id at 752 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
112. Id; sirA hI )4 431 US. at 658 (stating that an order that is suffixciently collateral to permit
interlocutory appal involves an important right which is effectively unreviewable on appeal from
3final judgment3.
113. Fer, 332 F.3d at 752 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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properly assess any prejudice suffered. 4 In addition, the dissent noted the
possible post-trial remedies to cure improper notice, such as a new trial or
resentencing."' Thus, the dissent concluded that the district court's order did
not satisfy any of the three requirements for collateral orders.1 6
IV. Appliaaim inm b
The Fourth Circuit's holding has no direct effect on Virginia state cases
because Virginia does not have a Death Notice process.' In Virginia, the
indictment provides notice to defendants that the Commonwealth intends to
seek the death penalty."8 Yet, section 19.2-231 of the Virginia Code allows the
indictment to be amended "at any time before the jury returns a verdict or the
court finds the accused guilty... provided the amendment does not change the
nature or character of the offense charged."" 9 In Poue/ u Cawua%1&b120 the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that it was reversible error for the trial court to
allowpre-trial amendment of a capital murder indictment.' The court explained
that when amendments are allowed they" must provide that the substantial rights
of the accused are protected byinforming him of the nature and character of the
accusations."'22 In Poudl, the amended indictment charged two new gradation
crimes that were never considered bythe grand jury.1u The court held that this
type of amendment "materially changed the nature of the offense originally
charged."124 Capital defense attorneys should use Pouta!to prevent the Common-
wealth from amending capital indictments without aggravators to include aggra-
vators. Thus, even without a formal Death Notice process, Virginia capital
defendants have the right to adequate notice that the Commonwealth will seek
the death penalty against them.
The four factors for reasonableness are relevant to attorneys defending
federal capital cases. In particular, the third factor focuses on the interval
114. Id
115. Id
116. Id at 753 (lMemeyer, J., dissenting).
117. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.-220 (Mflchie 2000) (stating that the indictment or information
shall describe the offense charged). Buts 18 US.C S 3593(a) (2000) (requiring a notice of intent
to seek the death penalty in a federal capital prosecution).
118. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.-220 (stating that the indictment shall describe the offense
charged).
119. SwVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-231 (lfchie 2000) (discussing when an indictment, present-
ment, or information maybe amended and the procedure for such amendment).
120. 544 S.E.2d 679 (Va. 2001).
121. Powell v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 679, 692 (Va. 2001).
122. Id at 691.




between the filing of the Death Notice and the trial.' For purposes of pre-trial
Death Notice challenges, the scheduled trial date is an important part of the
court's analysis. 2 6 In order for reviewing courts to assess the reasonableness of
Death Notice filings, they must be able to reference both the filing date and the
trial date."' To ensure proper review, attorneys should get a trial date and hold
that date pending the arrival of a Death Notice.
The court in Fenie stated that "one of the rights guaranteed by section
3593(a) is that not to be forced to stand trialfr ow's ifi without having received
adequate notice. " " Implici in the majority's opinion is the sense that the
complexity of capital trials necessitates sufficient preparation time. Feex seems
to support the idea that death cases impose unique demands on the preparation
of a defense."2 9 In particular, defense counsel need substantial time to prepare
mitigation for a death case."O Although the court in Fewnidid not explicitlybase
its decision on the notion that "death is different," its repeated emphasis that
defendants should not stand trial for their lives without adequate preparation
tine recognizes the inherent differences between capital and non-capital cases."'
Fenie emphasizes the prophylactic nature of S 3593(a) bystating that "[t]his
statutorily-created right not to be tried for a capital sentence without having
received reasonable notice can only be effectuated by an interpretation that the
statute imposes a prophylactic requirement which, in turn, nestaz a pretrial
inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the notice provided."' The court
suggested that judges cannot cure defective Death Notices by postponing the
trial date.' Once a defendant is denied adequate time to prepare his defense, his
125. Fenir 332 F.3d at 737.
126. Id at 737 n.6.
127. Id The Fourth Crcuit stated that in order to quantify the time remaining before trial:
[A] court naturally must have reference to tw dates: the first, obviously, being the date
the Death Notice is filed, and the second, obviously being the trial date. Less obvious
is that the scheduled trial date may constitute the trial date for purposes of analysis
under section 3293(a) because of the prophylactic nature of the statutory right.
Id
128. Id at 729 (emphasis added).
129. S i/d at 740 n.8 (discussing possible delay resulting from the "unique requirements of
a capital trial").
130. Se Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. C. 2527, 2535 (2003) (discussing defense counsel's inade-
quate investigation of mitigation evidence).
131. Fmrd, 332 F.3d at 732; seeFahyv. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d CAr. 2001) (stating that
"less than 'extraordinary' circumstances" should trigger equitable tolling in death penalty cases).
132. Faubg 332 F.3d at 731; see 18 US.C S 3593(a) (2000) (providing that the Government
shall file a notice of its intent to seek the death penaltya reasonable time before trial.
133. Fenir 332 F.3d at 740 n.8 (discussing the ambiguityof the district court's suggestion that
prejudice to defendants may be cured by having the court grant additional time to prepare the
defense case).
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S 3593(a) right is denied. 34 Fere implies that this statutory right is preventative
and cannot be cured bysubsequent judicial action. 31 Attorneys should object to
judges' attempts to cure late Death Notices by postponing the trial date.
The Fourth Circuit's decision illustrates the importance of timely Death
Notices. In United State v Hauen,'36 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia barred the Government from seeking the
death penalty." The court found that the prosecution unreasonably delayed its
decision to seek the death penaltybywaiting for approval from the United States
AttomeyGeneral.3 8 Attorneys should object to attempts byprosecutors to delay
the filing of Death Notices pending approval by the United States Attorney
General. Defense counsel should also be aware of prosecutorial attempts to file
"protective" Death Notices.'39 Protective Death Notices are notices filed bythe
prosecution prior to certification by the Attorney General. However, a Death
Notice filed without approval bythe Attorney General violates the United States
Attorneys' Manual Rule 9-10.020, which requires prior written approval for any
decision to seek the death penalty."4 Therefore, attorneys should object to any
attempt by the prosecution to file a Death Notice without having obtained
written approval from the Attorney General to seek the death penalty.
V. Cbndi/on
In Feek, the Fourth Czt-uit clarified that pre-trial orders challenging the
timeliness of a Death Notice are immediately appealable under the collateral
order exception. 4' Under S 3593(a), defendants have the right not to stand trial
without having adequate notice that the Government intends to seek the death
134. See id at 732 (stating that a defendant's rights are "denied at the point when he proceeds
toward trial, or actualy to trial, in the absence of a reasonable time between his receipt of the Death
Notice and his capital trial").
135. R at 740 n.8.
136. 276 F. Supp. 2d 574 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
137. United States v. Hatten, 276 F. Supp. 2d 574, 575 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
138. Id at 580. The court held that the tbirty-six day interval between the fling of the Death
Notice and the scheduled trial date did not satisfy the reasonable timeliness requirement of 5
3593(a). Id at 579-80. SE Posting of Kevin McNally, kmcnalldcr.net, to fedtrials-
l@Hofstra.edu (Sept. 6, 2003) (copy on file with author) (discussing district court's decision to
prohibit the death penaltydue to untimely notice).
139. Posting of Jean D. Barrett, JeanBarreu@RuhnandBarrett.corn, to
fedtrials-4@Hofstra.edu (June 6, 2003) (copy on file with author); see Posting of Kevin McNally,
kmcnall dcr.net, to JeanBarrett@Ruhnandarrett.com (June 6,2003) (copyon file with author)
(responding to question concerning protective Death Notices).
140. SEU.S. Att'yMan. S 9-10.020 (1997) (stating that "[tlhe death penaltyshall not be sought
without the prior written authorization of the Attorney General").
141. Fedx 332 F.3d at 730.
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penalty.14 1 Most importantly, the timeliness of Death Notices is determined by
a pre-trial objective reasonableness analysis.
1 43
Jessie A. Seiden
142. Id at 729;s 18 U.S.C § 3593(a) (2000) (providing that the Government shall file a notice
of its intent to seek the death penalty a reasonable time before trial.
143. Faeu, 332 F.3d at 734.
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